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“Panentheism, Neutral Monism, and Advaita Vedanta.”
PANENTHEISM AND NATURAL SCIENCE: A GOOD
MATCH?
by Willem B. Drees
Abstract. Is panentheism a metaphysical and religious under-
standing of the divine and of the world that aligns better with science
than classical theism? In order to address this question, I’ll present
brief descriptions of theism, pantheism, and panentheism, and of re-
ligious visions as integrating models of the world and models for the
world. In this respect, science has its limitations. The conclusion that
I will argue for is that naturalistic varieties of theism, pantheism, and
panentheism do equally well with respect to the natural sciences, and
hence that there is no argument from science that favors a panentheistic
metaphysics. There may be philosophical or religious arguments that
make one prefer one position over another. Science can be involved in
the choice for one interpretation of a religious-metaphysical view such
as panentheism. Thus, science might play a role in the development of
positions, once chosen, and hence in intra-religious competition, even
though it cannot be decisive on fundamental choices in metaphysics.
Keywords: agnosticism; limits of science; naturalism; panenthe-
ism; science; theism
Does “panentheism” reinforce the dialogue between science and religion?
Any answer depends on one’s understanding of “science,” of “religion,” and
of the aim of “the dialogue.” We’ll get to those topics below, but first, we
need to offer a provisional understanding of “panentheism”—a position
with many faces, according to the title of the symposium at the Collegium
Helveticum in Zürich from which the contributions in this section are
Willem B. Drees is Dean of the Tilburg School of Humanities and Professor of Philoso-
phy of the Humanities at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. He also serves as the editor of
Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science. He can be reached at w.b.drees@tilburguniversity.edu.
[Zygon, vol. 52, no. 4 (December 2017)]
www.zygonjournal.org
1060C© 2017 The Authors. Zygon R© published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc. on behalf of Institute on Religion in an Age of Science ISSN 0591-2385
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs License, which
permits use and distribution in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited, the use is non-commercial and no
modifications or adaptations are made.
Willem B. Drees 1061
drawn. Does panentheism reinforce “the dialogue between science and
religion,” or rather their co-existence, and does it do so better than major
alternatives such as theism and pantheism? Or does each of them face
similar challenges when one tries to make a case on the basis of science,
given the limitations of our natural sciences?
The first section will offer my articulation of theism, pantheism, and
panentheism. The second section quotes some arguments by respected
colleagues who see “panentheism” as an attractive option in “religion
and science.” The evaluation begins in section three with a reflection on the
nature of worldviews–such as panentheism–and the question when these
could be considered “religious.” I will appropriate the definition of Clifford
Geertz for this purpose. The fourth section offers a brief description of my
understanding of natural science. The penultimate section considers the
limitations of science, and claims that these are such that science cannot
distinguish between a naturalistic theism, a naturalistic panentheism, or
similar views. Though panentheism may be an interesting philosophical
view, it is not one that is more favored by science (or less in conflict with
science) than alternatives such as theism or pantheism. However, some in-
terpretations of such a metaphysical-religious position may be more in line
with science, and thus be preferable over other interpretations. Thus, the
engagement with science is relevant in intra-religious competition rather
than in the competition between grand metaphysical-religious schemes.
THEISM, PANTHEISM, AND PANENTHEISM: THREE GRAND
SCHEMES
Terminologically, pan-en-theism seems to be a position that combines ele-
ments of pantheism and theism, by claiming that everything is ‘in’ God,
though God transcends the world. Sometimes, it seems to mean that God
is in everything, emphasizing divine immanence; “dependence goes both
ways” (Henriksen 2017, 1081). Let me briefly characterize theism and
pantheism before turning towards panentheism.
Theism
Theism can be defined as the position of those who believe in God. This
does not help too much, unless one defines what kind of being a theist
understands by ‘God.’ There are, of course, many approaches, but one
prominent philosopher of religion, Richard Swinburne, may be taken as a
fairly typical voice. The second sentence of the revised edition of his book
The Coherence of Theism (1993, 1) comes to the point immediately:
By a “God” he [a theist] understands something like a “person without a
body (i.e. a spirit) who is eternal, free, able to do anything, knows everything,
is perfectly good, is the proper object of human worship and obedience, the
creator and sustainer of the universe.”
1062 Zygon
Any of these characteristics can be disputed, but for the present contri-
bution I want to emphasize a few elements as characteristic of most forms
of theism.
(a) God is worthy of worship. If one were to say of a king or a president
that the person is worthy of respect, a value judgement is given. A
value judgment is implied even more when we speak of “worthy of
worship,” because “worship” far surpasses “respect.” Creatures are not
to be worshipped. Upon a traditional Christian view, well supported
by our experiences, we and other creatures are imperfect, and perhaps
even sinful, “fallen,” and thus in need of redemption.
(b) With the emphasis on perfection and all-encompassing knowledge,
power, and goodness, God is taken to be the Supreme Being, the one
who cannot be surpassed. I prefer the more cautious “negative” for-
mula that we owe to Anselm (eleventh century), who in his Proslogion
reflected upon God as “a being greater than which nothing can be
thought.”
(c) As creator and sustainer of the universe, there is a categorical dis-
tinction between God and everything else—the distinction between
Creator and creatures. The Creator is the one to whom we all owe
existence, and who is the ultimate judge of value.
Pantheism/Religious Naturalism
Pan-theism, etymologically a combination of the Greek term for “all.” pan,
and “theism,” does without such a strong categorical distinction between
Creator and creatures. Rather, “nature” is all there is. There is nothing
else, nothing greater. However, as a religious position, it is not just a
belief about existence, but also one about value. “Nature” has value. “Awe”
and “wonder” might be terms that come easily to a pantheist, a deep
appreciation and gratitude for nature and all that it has given us. A classic
expression goes back to the seventeenth century philosopher Benedict
Spinoza, ‘deus sive natura,’ speaking of reality as ‘God or nature.’
A more recent title that resonates with such a position is the one used
by cell biologist Ursula Goodenough, The Sacred Depths of Nature (1998).
She advocates a contemporary articulation of such a position, ‘religious
naturalism’ (for her work and related voices see the website of the Re-
ligious Naturalist Association, http://religious-naturalist-association.org/,
and studies such as those of Jerome Stone [2009] and Donald Crosby
[2015]; see Drees 2006).
As religious naturalism and pantheism come in many varieties (as does
theism), let me highlight a few motives.
(a) Some “religious naturalists” seem to be driven by a dislike of the dual-
ism implied in a categorical distinction between Creator and creatures;
they prefer some form of philosophical monism.
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(b) By doing away with a transcendent or supernatural reality, the pantheist
seems to avoid epistemological claims that go beyond the domain of
experience. Thus, pantheism seems to align well with the empirical
sciences.
(c) Affective preferences may also be involved. “Immanence” is preferred
over “transcendence”; nearness over distance. Rather than a supreme
being “out there” who judges us—whether imagined as a Father or
as Lord—it is Nature that “judges us,” because some ways of life are
more effective and fertile than others; a line of thinking expressed by
the founding editor of this journal, Ralph Burhoe, in an essay on “the
Lord of History” (1975).
Panentheism
Now for pan-en-theism, here taken as distinct from theism and from pan-
theism or religious naturalism, though this label is used for variants of
those positions as well. My teacher in philosophy of religion at Groningen
University, H. G. Hubbeling, had written on Karl Barth and Emil Brunner,
two major Protestant theologians in Europe in the middle of the twentieth
century, on Spinoza, and on Charles Hartshorne and his logical recon-
struction of the modal version of the ontological argument. He introduced
me to the concept of panentheism.
Panentheism stands between pantheism and theism. Here the world is seen
“in” God, but God still transcends the world. This concept is, however, not
clear in every respect, because in theism also God is both transcendent and
immanent, which would imply that the world is in God. Here one may
think of Paul’s saying: ‘ . . . for in him we live and move, in him we exist’
(Acts 17: 28). But insofar as panentheists say that the world has not been
created by God but has emanated from him, and still maintain that God
transcends the world, they certainly take a middle position between theism
and pantheism. (Hubbeling 1987, 143)
Hubbeling points out the similarity of theism and panentheism. As
he formulates it, the difference is in the distinction between creation and
emanation, and with that in the question whether God and world are
categorically distinct as Creator and creatures, or whether they are more
alike, as the concept of emanation suggests. By shifting from “creation”
to “emanation,” there is also a shift towards pantheism—the world as
produced is similar in kind to the one who produced the world.
Hubbeling mentions one possible motive in favor of panentheism:
“It is difficult to choose between theism and pantheism, and perhaps a
middle system like panentheism should be preferred.” However, immedi-
ately thereafter, Hubbeling wrote: “On the whole, I prefer theism” (1987,
147). Thus, he himself does not opt for the middle, but points out that
one of the attractions might be its position, as mediator between two major
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options. I do not accept such a rhetorical argument—for then, by arrang-
ing options in such a way that the preferred outcome is in the middle, we
could make the middle position more plausible. Thus, a question to be
addressed in the next section is: Why opt for panentheism?
ATTRACTIONS OF PANENTHEISM
There may be various good reasons to opt for a panentheistic view. The
main question in the present article is whether such reasons have their basis
in science, or whether these are philosophical or religious in kind.
In the context of ‘religion and science’ panentheism has been discussed
and defended in In Whom We Live and Move and Have Our Being: Panen-
theistic Reflections on God’s Presence in a Scientific World, a volume edited
by Philip Clayton and Arthur Peacocke (2004). The main title derives
from a statement attributed to the apostle Paul when he visits Athens and
encounters an altar for an unknown God—claiming that he, as a follower
of Jesus Christ, now comes to inform the people of Athens on God who,
unknown to them, they already worshipped, the only true God. Within
that context in the biblical book of Acts of the Apostles, God is described as
the one in whom we live, move and have our being (Acts 17: 28), a line
also quoted by Hubbeling, above.
In the introductory essay Arthur Peacocke described a theistic position:
God is external to the world and not influenced by the world. The emphasis
on impassibility (aloof, not being influenced by) makes it hard to articulate
a coherent understanding of God’s involvement in the world—especially
if that world is understood as guided by natural laws.
The factors which have together provoked the current revival of the term
“panentheism” are in fact extremely significant for our understanding of
God’s relation to the world, including humanity. Broadly they all point to
the need to accentuate, in the light of contemporary knowledge of the world
and of humanity, a much stronger sense than in the past of the immanence of
God as in some sense “in” the world—without, for most authors, demeaning
from or qualifying God’s ultimate transcendence, God’s ontological ultimate
“otherness.” (Peacocke 2004a, xix)
Thus, Peacocke maintains key elements of the theistic stance, but along-
side divine openness to the world (passibility) he stresses ‘immanence,’
God’s presence in the world, which the term pan-en-theism expresses in the
reverse, the world’s inclusion in God. Peacocke points to some elements
of science that seem to support such a religious orientation, such as coher-
ence and lawfulness (thus, no supernatural interventions) and the dynamic
character of reality, in which complex phenomena ‘emerge’ out of more
elementary processes and constituents.
(1) The “seamless character of the web” implies that “at no point do
modern natural scientists have to invoke any non-natural causes to
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explain their observations and their inferences about the past. This in-
telligible and all-pervasive continuity . . . has rendered it increasingly
problematic to conceive of God’s action in the world as intervening
in any way that involves an abrogation of the very regularities with
which God’s own self is regarded, by theists, as having endowed the
world” (Peacocke 2004a, xx) Hence, no ‘interventions’ that suspend
the laws of nature, and thus no miracles, if these are understood as
interventions.
(2) “Moreover, the past and present processes of the natural world are
characterized by ‘emergence,’ for there appear in the course of time
new forms of matter, often articulated in a hierarchical manner. . . .
New kinds of realities come into existence, often by a process of
self-organization of natural systems in ways explicable by the relevant
sciences. This has provoked a renewed emphasis on the immanence
if God as creator ‘in, with, and under’ the creative, natural processes
of the world unveiled by the sciences” (Peacocke 2004a, xx) In this
context, one might speak of ontological emergence, as new entities
emerge. There is creativity in reality. Peacocke adds, however, that
the processes by which entities these emerge may be scientifically
intelligible.
(3) “Furthermore, the entirely justified abandonment by philosophers
and cognitive scientists of any dualistic account of human nature—in
the past usually in terms of mind/body or mind/brain—has inevitably
reflected upon the use of traditional models of God’s relation to the
world in terms of personal agency.” Thus, as Peacocke sees it, the
only ontological dualism that seems to be theologically supportable
is simply “the distinction between the ultimate ontology of God and
that of everything else, the ‘creation’” (Peacocke 2004a, xxi). Given
the description in the previous section, with this distinction Peacocke
remains at the theistic end of the spectrum.
Later, in his own contribution in the volume, Peacocke describes the
modern scientific picture of the world. He then makes the transition to
theology: “Clearly the deistic conception of a God external to nature—
dwelling in an entirely different kind of space and being of a ‘substance’
sufficiently different that it could not be involved continuously in the
created order—does not cohere with these new insights into the world and
its processes” (Peacocke 2004b, 143). God must be envisaged as involved
in creative processes in the world, the processes through which life evolves
and complex new realities emerge.
In his contribution to the same volume, “Panentheism in Metaphysical
and Scientific Perspective,” Philip Clayton offers a variety of reasons for
panentheism. Among those, the second one points to science: “One might
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be convinced that panentheism is more compatible than traditional theism
with particular results in physics or biology, or with common features
shared across the scientific disciplines, such as the structure of emergence”
(Clayton 2004, 73). Other motives he lists include a rejection of classical
theism combined with a dislike of atheism, a belief in the truth of a
particular metaphysical position (process philosophy, German idealism)
being able to preserve better particular religious beliefs (e.g. about divine
action); the desire to have a position that mediates between Western and
Eastern religious philosophical systems; a position that might be religiously
more viable (e.g. not burdened with the problem of evil); and one that has
preferable ethical or political implications (e.g. with respect to ecological
responsibility) (73-74). However, he thinks the most prominent thinkers
turn to panentheism because it seems to do a better job for making sense of
God-language. Besides, “a panentheistic understanding of the God-world
relationship is able to make connections with other academic fields” (74).
Clayton’s own arguments focus on the metaphysics of the subject and on
emergence as developed in contemporary philosophy of science (Clayton
2004, 75). The whole is more than the parts. “Numerous scientific ex-
amples can be given: superconductivity . . . ; thermodynamical properties
. . . ; chemical properties . . . ; the life of cell functioning . . . ; organisms
. . . ; and a number of animals (especially the higher primates) manifest
qualities of inner experience that emerge from but are not reducible to, the
complexities of their central nervous systems” (85–86). Each of these phe-
nomena needs its own conceptualization, its own approach, though they
arise out of particular configurations of “lower level” entities. One might
speak of “epistemic” emergence. On this basis, Clayton makes a shift to
theology:
My thesis is simple: emergence provides the best available means, for those
who take science seriously, to rethink (i.e., establish a new conceptual basis
for) the immanence of God. (87)
There are various others who have written on panentheism. In a recent
volume on Alternative Concepts of God: Essays on the Metaphysics of the Divine
(Buckareff and Nagasawa 2016), the emphasis is more on philosophy of
religion than on the natural sciences. Yujin Nagasawa argues for “modal
panentheism”: God is the totality of all possible worlds, and all possible
worlds exist to the same extent that the actual world exists (2016, 12).
And John Bishop and Ken Perszyk propose “euteleological panentheism”
(2016, 119–25). The problem of evil is especially strong for a theistic
conception—where God is omnipotent, omniscient, as well as perfectly
good. As Bishop and Perszyk see it, this should be a reason to qualify the
conception of the divine. On their euteleological conception, “the divine
may be identified, not just with Love as the supreme good which is the
ultimate telos of all that exists, but, at the same time, with reality at its most
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profound or ultimate—that is to say, with reality as inherently directed
upon the supreme good, and actually existing only because that end is
fulfilled” (121).
These provide an all too brief sample of panentheistic voices. Clearly,
there is fundamental philosophical discourse on panentheism; for exam-
ple, on teleology (Bishop and Perszyk) and modality (Nagasawa). And in
discussions on panentheism one also finds references to emergence as a
scientific way of understanding the rise of complex phenomena in the nat-
ural world (Peacocke, Clayton), whether ontological (new entities) and/or
epistemic (new explanatory approaches). However, for someone who does
not share the interest in such a religious-metaphysical position, it might
be unclear why those scientific insights by themselves are considered reli-
giously relevant. But before turning to science, let us consider under what
conditions a philosophical position such as panentheism could be considered
religious—which is the topic of the next section, a brief reflection on a way
of understanding religions as worldviews with value-dimensions.
RELIGION: ETHOS AND WORLDVIEW
Are theism, pantheism, and panentheism religious positions, or merely
philosophical, metaphysical ones? To reflect upon this, we need to pay
attention to the concept of “religion.” For our purpose here, I want to
make use of the definition of the anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1966, 4;
1973, 90):
A religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful
moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general
order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of
factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.
A page earlier, he wondered what religious symbols (and texts and rituals)
do:
Sacred symbols function to synthesize a people’s ethos—the tone, character,
and quality of their life, the aesthetic style and mood—and their world
view—the picture they have of the way things in sheer actuality are, their
most comprehensive ideas of order. (1966, 3; 1973, 89)
The combination of worldview, “conceptions of a general order of ex-
istence,” and ethos, “moods and motivations,” has been expressed also as
the combination of models of the world and models for the world. Thus,
if a believer praises God as Creator of heaven and earth, not only does
the theist endorse a particular model of the world—“God not part of the
world, made the world. At the same time, the theist expresses attitudes,
or at least implies them; perhaps those of gratitude and awe, as well as
modesty and responsibility, to take care of God’s gift.
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The engagement with science most directly regards the “models of the
world.” Observations and experiments support empirical theories, and
those theories may be incorporated in a larger framework, say the standard
scientific understanding of the world. That could be the input into a
worldview, sometimes also called a “cosmology.” My understanding is that
this is a hypothetical-deductive “way up.” from empirical observations
to theories to more encompassing theories, and in that process, there is
creativity involved. There is underdetermination—the higher is a theory
that is consistent with the observations, but it need not be the only such
theory possible.
Similarly, moral intuitions feed into more encompassing moral systems,
and thus, one might envisage a system of values, an axiology, as the parallel
to a worldview, but now for models for the world. Philosophically speaking,
those two lines of reflection and research—the one moving up to an
encompassing worldview, the other to an encompassing moral vision—are
distinct. Though in the complexities of daily life judgments of value and
of facts are not always distinguished well, we have learned to consider
these different kinds of judgments. Conflating the two has been called
“the naturalistic fallacy,” especially when one moves from descriptive to
prescriptive statements, from “is” to “ought.”
If we take the definition of Geertz for guidance, in a religious view both
lines of reflection come together and are intertwined. For a philosophical
view rooted in science, a worldview, to be a religious (or non-religious)
view of life, it has to have a moral and aesthetic message, and to relate
these to an understanding of reality, of the way things are taken to be, so
that those values are “realistic” (see for a more extensive appropriation of
Geertz for “religion and science.” Drees 2010, 76–82, 136–39).
The considerations in favor of panentheism given above do indicate
such a combination, by valuing the dynamics of life and hence of the
emergence of complexity, as Peacocke and Clayton do, and by reflecting
upon the problem of evil, as in the contribution by Bishop and Perszyk.
Is such a rich panentheism, loaded with symbols that synthesize ethos and
worldview, supported by the natural sciences? To address this question, we
will turn to a brief reflection upon the natural sciences.
DELIVERIES OF SCIENCE
Before returning to panentheism and its alternatives in relation to science,
I want to reflect briefly on some characteristics of contemporary science.
Multiple Levels of Description
The natural sciences articulate knowledge about reality, for instance about
matter, substances, stuff. A classic example, present in almost all chemistry
labs in secondary schools, is the periodic table of the elements, which
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begins with hydrogen and helium, and orders the various chemical elements
in rows and columns. This scheme embodies knowledge, mostly acquired
in the nineteenth century, on substances and their constituents. At this level
of description, we—or at least the chemists among us—seem to understand
reality quite well. It is knowledge to which people of various countries and
cultures have contributed, which allows chemists to study and create new
substances. It is, heuristically and pragmatically, extraordinarily effective.
We also know why the table has the structure it has; for instance, why
there are various similarities (e.g., between elements on different rows in
the same column) and why there are that many elements on each row. This
has to with the structure of individual atoms, with a nucleus (protons,
neutrons) surrounded by electrons, and the consequences of a description
of such a system in terms of quantum physics. With such a description,
we move into the territory of physics. Within physics, theories have been
developed that probe more deeply, and describe protons and neutrons as
consisting of sets of three “quarks,” held together by particles called “glu-
ons.” This theory passes sophisticated empirical tests well, but it is farther
removed from human experience than the knowledge presented in the pe-
riodic table. It is a level of knowledge that is not needed within chemistry
when considering the efficacy of drugs in pharmaceutical contexts, but
nonetheless genuine knowledge. What then are quarks? Some branches of
physics dig further. Among the ideas proposed are theories that describe
reality in terms of minute vibrating strings (string theory), but here we
clearly have moved into rather provisional, speculative areas of science.
Similar “layers of understanding” arise at many places. Gravity was ef-
fectively described in 1687 by Isaac Newton in his Philosophiae Naturalis
Principia Mathematica, as a force acting at a distance. This was an excellent
theory that served very well to explain and predict movements on earth and
in the heavens. However, it did not align well with a major success of the
nineteenth century, James Clerk Maxwell’s equations that described electro-
magnetic radiation. Newton’s equations of motions were harmonized with
electromagnetism (and the constant speed of light) in the early twentieth
century with Albert Einstein’s special theory of relativity (1905). A further
development, the general theory of relativity (1915), incorporated gravity
by replacing the idea of gravity as a force working at a distance by the effect
of curvature of space-time. For low velocities (relative to the velocity of
light) and modest masses, Einstein’s general relativity theory would give the
same results as Newton’s, which thus continues to be a very effective way
of understanding movements in the world around us. But deeper down,
it presents to us a different ontology, a different understanding of the way
things are. And Einstein’s theory might not be the final answer yet either, as
it is not in line with another extremely successful theory, quantum physics.
Proposals for further developments in “quantum gravity” have been made
(superstrings; most recently, a proposal on “emergent gravity” that draws
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on quantum information and the holographic properties of surfaces of
black holes, by Erik Verlinde 2016), but here we are clearly in an area were
all current science is hypothetical and explorative rather than consolidated.
In this contribution, I intend to point out some of the characteristics of
this multilayered understanding of science that this selective history might
be taken to indicate.
(1) There is consolidated science, such as embedded in the periodic table.
Though all science is a human construction, this layer of understand-
ing is so well established, confirmed by numerous experiments, and
used effectively in a wide variety of practices, that at that level of
description one should not dismiss such knowledge.
(2) However, if one pushes further, there is the current frontier of science.
Scientists disagree, theories and models may be proposed but not yet
tested (and perhaps even not yet testable with current technologies).
Some of these might become successful, and become consolidated
science. Some might fail and be discarded, with honor. And some
proposals might remain undecided.
(3) Among those that are undecided, and beyond the boundary of well-
defined scientific theories and models, one finds proposals that are
rather hypothetical and speculative, at a distance from empirical test-
ing and pragmatic use. Issues about emergent gravity and other pro-
posals in quantum gravity should be considered as such, and ideas
about multiple domains of the universe, so called “multiverses,” be-
yond our horizon.
(4) And interpretations of well-established science, such as quantum
physics, may remain speculative. There may be multiple interpre-
tations of a single mathematical formalism, and those interpretations
seem to be empirically equivalent.
It is in the realm of proposals (3) and of interpretations (4) that most of
the metaphysically interesting issues are, such as questions about the nature
of time, about ultimate origins, about determinism or indeterminism, and
the like. But those domains are also most marked by a plurality of research
programs, driven by different philosophical preferences.
Why Should We Respect Science?
Science is done by humans. It is the outcome of social processes. It is
fallible, because people may cheat. Why then should we take the sciences
seriously? Such a challenge became more prominent with Thomas Kuhn’s
book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962), which considered major
changes—so-called revolutions—changes in the ruling “paradigm.” The
most prominent example was the shift from a geocentric understanding of
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the universe to a heliocentric one, with Nicholas Copernicus and Galilei
Galileo in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. If we have been wrong
in the past, should we not assume that we can be mistaken today as well?
The history sketched above might allow for some differentiation. At a
practical level, the transition from the geocentric to the heliocentric view
did not undermine predictions, for example on solstices. And even if our
understanding of substance “deep down” is likely to change, the knowledge
embodied in the periodic table, that is, the knowledge used in chemistry,
is likely to remain unaffected. Within a domain such as chemistry, we have
made enormous progress since the early nineteenth century, not only with
the periodic table but also in discovering the rich variety of materials that
can be made with these elements. Just as the “flat earth” is no longer worthy
of serious discussion, given all our knowledge of the earth, our experiences
with weather satellites and intercontinental flights, and much more, so too
a division of matter in just four or five categories, say fire, air, water and
earth, is something of the past, at least at that level of description.
The Kuhnian challenge has triggered quite some work in the philosophy
of science. One example of relevant work, in my opinion, is Philip Kitcher’s
The Advancement of Science (1993), which takes the social character of
scientific research seriously, but argues that despite radical changes there is
sufficient continuity in the whole complex of science—not just theories,
but also questions, techniques and much else—that one can speak of
progress. Thus, though current knowledge is not the final answer, it may be
taken to be serious enough, especially when scientific insights make major
advances at the theoretical level by unifying, expanding and correcting
theories, and/or at the practical level, either because of applicability in a
wide variety of domains (as chemistry) or as insights that once were new
become so well established that they serve as tools in further research (e.g.
using electrons in electron microscopy).
What Does Respecting Science Entail?
There are intellectual and moral reasons to respect science. By using the
best available knowledge we can help people. Playing down established
knowledge makes it easy to exploit vulnerable people. Experimental evi-
dence that smoking causes cancer, not just among smokers but also among
bystanders, made it possible to promote wiser policies. Of course, such
steps are not always welcome. Thus, we find that science is played down
in the interest of the tobacco industry, and more recently for the sake of
those with an interest in fossil fuels. And, more driven by ideology than
driven by economic interest, the opposition to evolution and to vaccina-
tion is also a context in which advocates of various positions play down
science, including science that I would classify as “consolidated.” Each of
those appeals to doubt and provisionality, some lavishly funded and legally
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smart, as documented in Merchants of Doubt by Naomi Oreskes and Erik
Conway (2010), plays down established science for the sake of nonscien-
tific interests. In consequence, vulnerable people suffer. Though we should
allow freedom to advocate nonsense, we also have the responsibility to
live and work with the best available knowledge, and hence to counter
nonsense. Serious thinkers in “religion and science” should align them-
selves with fair-minded sceptics, who challenge the exploitation of human
gullibility.
The natural sciences deliver knowledge such as that embodied in the
periodic table, through a collaborative effort of scientists from many dif-
ferent national and cultural backgrounds. Such knowledge is well tested
and confirmed, and turns out to be eminently applicable. In those cases,
it is a matter of practical wisdom that we should use such knowledge as
much as possible, in the domains were it has been shown to be valid. The
judge of such knowledge is the scientific community; decisions are not
up to outsiders who, for economic, political, cultural, social, religious, or
philosophical interest would have preferred a different “science.” However,
such knowledge is not the answer to metaphysical or moral questions; that
would reach too far.
WHAT DOES RESPECTING SCIENCE NOT ENTAIL?
Science needs to be taken seriously. And I find panentheism conceptually
an interesting position, though hard to grasp and pin down, and I have great
respect for the late Arthur Peacocke. But does panentheism do particularly
well with respect to science? We’ll consider how science does in four
domains of potential metaphysical and religious interest: the interpretation
of scientific theories and concepts; ultimate questions about existence; the
foundation of universal, moral, values; and the foundation of particular,
existential, values.
Multiple Interpretations of Scientific Theories and Concepts
Even if scientific theories are understood as well-established, they need not
have an unambiguous philosophical interpretation. Possible interpretations
of scientific theories are not determined by the theories, even though any
theory constrains the range of its possible interpretations. There may be
multiple interpretations of well-established theories, that is, multiple ways
of describing the philosophical, human, moral, religious, or metaphysical
consequences of a particular scientific theory.
It is fairly widely known that there are multiple interpretations of quan-
tum physics; they describe ways the world could possibly be (Van Fraassen
1984, 171). Quantum physics is not exceptional; other theories allow for
multiple interpretations too. Relativity theory can be formulated as a the-
ory about the development of the universe through time, or as a theory
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about the whole four-dimensional space-time as a “block universe” at once,
just as a film can be shown as a temporal narrative or treated as a whole
as a single object. Similarly, dynamic systems can be described in terms of
phase space rather than as evolving in ordinary space. There are multiple
ways of understanding “time,” each one consistent with current science as
far as corroborated.
The concept of “emergence,” beloved by some of the panentheists as
different from “reduction,” is no exception to the openness to a plurality
of interpretations involved, but the clarity of meaning also suffers from
the variety of cases subsumed under the category of emergence. It is it-
self not a single theory or theoretical scheme, such as quantum physics,
but a label covering a variety of situations. In any particular instance of
a relationship between scientific theories that seem to describe different
levels—from thermodynamics (a gas with pressure and temperature and
a cloud of particles that move around with a certain velocity and hence
kinetic energy and momentum) to organic chemistry and biology, or neu-
roscience and consciousness—the way the levels are demarcated and the
conceptual relations are envisaged may be different. When the emphasis
is on new entities with properties not found previously, one might en-
visage such emergence as ontological. When the emphasis is on the new
conceptual vocabularies, the new theories and epistemic strategies at the
“higher” level relative to the lower one, one might consider it epistemic
emergence. Of course, there is much more detail in discussions on emer-
gence in philosophy of science, but here I would like to consider the
meaning of emergence and its alternative, reduction, in general terms, and
thus their potential significance when deciding on religious-metaphysical
schemes.
As I see it, any successful attempt to correlate descriptions at two different
levels of complexity could be considered an example of understanding
emergence, as it clarifies how new entities arise. It could also be considered
an example of reduction, as the new is correlated with the underlying
or preceding processes. In that general sense, emergence and reduction
can be considered two words for the same insight: the reality we live
in has many remarkable opportunities, and these tend to be connected.
Reduction and emergence are words that signal the dense web of relatedness
within natural reality, as studied by the natural sciences. A reductionist
description seeks to explain how Y might arise out of underlying processes
X (and in that sense would be holistic by embedding Y in the larger
understanding of which X is a part). Someone who values emergence
might say that Y has emerged out of X, in a particular context. A major
difference seems to be that the one values the “upper level” Y more, as
more complex, whereas the reductionist might consider the “lower level”
X more fundamental. Such a difference in appreciation is a matter of
interpretation; as far as the science is concerned, reduction and emergence
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might be understood as two sides of the same coin (Drees 2013; McMullin
2013).
Interpretation is, of course, even more the case when emergence is
interpreted religiously, in terms of “divine immanence,” as a panentheist
might opt to do. A theist could understand emergence as a possibility
of the laws of nature, given by God. And a pantheist could treat the
web of relations of emergence and reduction as a significant possibility
of nature, which thereby shows its rich potentiality, and realizes some its
potential. The divine may be seen nowhere or everywhere, but when such
religious language is used it is a religious or metaphysical interpretation
given to scientific theories; the theories themselves do not involve such a
vocabulary or meaning.
Ultimate Questions
Why is there something rather than nothing? Why is the world as it is?
These questions are unanswerable within the sciences, because a scientific
explanation does not begin with “nothing” it assumes laws and existence.
These laws can be questioned, too, but that pushes the horizon further.
We build our knowledge upon pillars driven deeper and deeper, but not
on pillars that rest on a self-evident and self-supporting layer of rocks.
Theism seems to have the advantage on this issue, as it offers an answer:
the answer to ultimate questions is “God,” the Creator of it all. However,
despite a long history of “cosmological” arguments for the existence of
God, none seem to have been decisive. Furthermore, giving “God” as the
answer raises a further question: Why is there such a God? The traditional
philosophical response, that God is His own cause (causa sui) does not
really convince as an answer; God, and God’s nature as the sole being that
has necessary existence, are assumptions.
A different orientation might be preferred by a pantheist or panentheist:
there is not a “being” who created this world, but a “Ground of Being”
(Drees 2016). An analogy might be with the role of axioms for a mathemat-
ical system: they are part of the system, not prior in time but fundamental
to the system as a whole. Such a “ground,” like the axioms, may be an
intrinsic part of the system, and that suits the pantheist. But from a point
of view outside the system, they are contingent; other axioms could have
been picked, and with other axioms a different reality.
If there is no necessary connection between the scientific understand-
ing and a particular religious or metaphysical scheme that would provide
an “ultimate explanation” of why the world exists and is as it is, science
does not make a difference when we seek a basis to choose between the-
ism, pantheism, and panentheism, as long as these respect the regularities
discovered by science. For the theist, this requires a “naturalistic theism”
without miracles that intervene in natural processes (but such positions do
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exist; see, for a more extensive discussion on religious naturalism alongside
naturalistic theism, Drees 2006, 116f.). Perhaps we do best to acknowledge
that we do not have access to the ultimate explanation; our models will
be inadequate—a motive with ancestry in ‘negative’ theology, because God
is always greater than we are our imaginations. “The” answer might remain
a mystery. In this vein, the physicist Charles Misner (1977, 95) wrote: “To
say that God created the Universe does not explain either God or the uni-
verse, but it keeps our consciousness alive to mysteries of awesome majesty
that we might otherwise ignore.”
In its avoidance of a positive answer, this statement might be sympathetic
to a panentheist, but in the end the claim is epistemic (agnostic) rather
than advocacy of any particular metaphysical position.
Universal Values
Moral conclusions need a moral premise, as well as scientific knowledge
about possible causes and consequences. Any reasoning that moves from
merely a description to a prescription suffers from the naturalistic fallacy.
Calling something “purely natural” may work in advertising, but is not a
valid argument. Thus, science by itself does not deliver moral values.
Theism might claim to provide an argument for universal values, though
historical, particular forms of theism have fallen short of that ideal. In order
to count as a religious position, panentheism has to incorporate a value
dimension as well. For many adherents who emphasize emergence, it has
one: valuing complexity over simplicity, the temporal over the timeless,
dynamics over static situations, and mind over the matter out of which
it emerged. None of this is itself a consequence of science, but neither is
it inconsistent with science. However, it may be difficult to make a case
for universality if values are related to contingent outcomes of natural
processes.
What We Care About: Particular Meaning
There is a different type of values, more particular in kind. Morally speak-
ing, I ought to value all humans equally. But in a personal sense, some
people are more important to me than others. And some pursuits are closer
to my own heart than others. Answering personal questions about one’s
loves and sources of meaning is not the business of science either. We
care about our loves, and we engage in projects that provide existential
meaning—and those are particular loves, rather than the universalizability
that is assumed in moral discourse (Frankfurt 1981; Wolf 2010; Van Stee
2017) as well as in science.
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CONCLUDING CONSIDERATIONS: AN AGNOSTIC STANCE AND
INTRA-RELIGIOUS ARGUMENTS
There seems to be no way to prefer panentheism over any of the other
grand metaphysical schemes, on the basis of science. The relation might be
in the opposite direction, from panentheism to science. As we have seen in
the remarks of Peacocke and of Clayton, some panentheists are appreciative
of science. A panentheistic interpretation of science provides a vocabulary
to speak about processes in reality in value-laden terms. This direction,
from a theological or metaphysical view to an interpretation of science,
seems to characterize the contribution by Jan-Olav Henriksen (2017) in
this issue. In his case, the point of departure is a Christian theology that
speaks of the Trinity and of sacraments, but understands these notions in
a way that they may be related to the world as described and understood
by contemporary science. Henriksen is quite explicit on the movement
from theology to panentheism: “The reasons contemporary Christian the-
ology has for considering panentheism a viable option can, therefore, be
articulated as related to theological concerns on several different levels”
(Henriksen 2017, p.1083).
Such a panentheistic interpretation of science may be positive for sci-
ence, because it may invite its adherents to appreciate and study those
phenomena—such as the way complexity emerges from more simple struc-
tures. It might also be positive for the underlying religious and metaphysical
preference, because that position thereby aligns itself with science, and ap-
parently appropriates some of the prestige of science.
Not all forms of panentheism may be equally open to the practice and
language of science. Panentheism might also align itself with a spirituality
that opposes “reduction,” and thus dislike the study of underlying pro-
cesses like studying the brain in relation to consciousness, or studying the
chemistry of cells in relation to life. A panentheist may see the divine in
a beautiful sunset, but for a romantic panentheistic it may be harder to
acknowledge that this is the outcome of the breaking of light in the atmo-
sphere. Romantic movements have appreciated nature, but they have not
always been conducive to a successful scientific study of natural processes.
Hence, some versions of religious panentheism may employ a discourse
and understanding of reality that aligns less with science, while other forms
of panentheism might be more easily articulated in ways that are consistent
with science. One could call those versions that do “naturalistic panen-
theisms.” They can co-exist well with science, because they seem to respect
the constraints of science as practice and as body of knowledge, and involve
the practice and conceptuality of science. Disagreement on engagement
with science might arise among panentheists. Aligning oneself with sci-
ence may thus serve well in intra-religious (or intra-religious-metaphysical)
discussions, as it appropriates some of the authority of science.
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However, given that the strength of science is primarily pragmatic and
heuristic, offering ideas about the way the world could possibly be, but not
delivering a decisive argument for a single metaphysical scheme, panenthe-
ism, as a broad religious-metaphysical view, is not better off in relation to
science than theism or pantheism. Naturalistic variants of theism might be
similarly able to co-exist with science, exploiting the room provided by the
underdetermination of worldviews by science for a different metaphysical-
religious scheme. There too, the main feature of the engagement with
science, the so-called “religion and science dialogue,” is that by claiming
to have science on one’s side, one particular interpretation of the major
metaphysical and religious position assumed, is considered preferable over
other interpretations. Science can be used in intra-religious disagreement,
more than in disagreement between religions or metaphysics (Drees 2010;
Olson 2011, 24–29).
Science provides constraints, but cannot determine our choice for a par-
ticular worldview or metaphysics. A preferred interpretation of a particular
worldview of religious vision will have to be argued with philosophical
arguments and moral and existential preferences, though intelligibility and
consistency with science are relevant too. A formulation that appeals to me,
because it combines an agnostic orientation in metaphysics with gratitude
for the potential of natural reality, has been offered by the novelist John
Fowles in his book of aphorisms The Aristos (1980, 27):
The ubiquitous absence of “God” in ordinary life is this sense of non-
existing, of mystery, of incalculable potentiality; this eternal doubt that
hovers between the thing in itself and our perception of it; this dimension
in and by which all other dimensions exist. The white paper that contains
a drawing; the space that contains a building; the silence that contains a
sonata; the passage of time that prevents a sensation or object continuing
forever; all these are “God.”
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